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introDuCtion
The adoption oF the rome statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in July 1998 placed four crimes within the jurisdiction of the court — genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. Of these, the 
crime of aggression remains inoperative. When negotiations 
over the definition and jurisdictional conditions for the crime of 
aggression deadlocked at Rome, the parties chose to table the 
issue. Aggression was included, but its application is contingent 
on the adoption of a definition by the states parties.1 This can 
happen, at the earliest, during the first Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute, to be held in 2009 or 2010.
In the intervening years, the Rome Statute has entered force 
and the court has begun operation. The United States signed 
the Rome Statute at the last possible moment — December 31, 
2000 — and then renounced its signatory status one and one-half 
years later. Meanwhile, negotiations on the definition of aggres-
sion have continued behind the scenes. Since 2002, however, 
these negotiations have proceeded without the participation or 
input of the United States. In that time, there has arguably been 
a shift in the tenor of negotiations away from U.S. positions. 
Provisions that received only minority support at Rome have 
now been largely accepted by the parties to the ICC.
For opponents of the court, these developments raise the 
distinct possibility that the ICC will adopt a definition of aggres-
sion that the United States considers unacceptable — an expan-
sive definition without strict control by the Security Council. 
Yet even for American supporters of the Court, the trend in the 
negotiations is troubling. Excluding the Security Council from 
the determination of whether aggression has occurred increases 
the likelihood of a political clash between the Permanent Five 
and the ICC that could prove highly damaging to the Court. 
Lowering the threshold for criminal aggression risks diverting 
the Court from serious war crimes and crimes against humanity 
to making a potentially difficult political determination in nam-
ing an aggressor. An expansive definition could be formulated 
to encompass legitimate actions in self-defense and potentially 
criminalize humanitarian actions. 
That adroit diplomatic maneuvering on the part of the United 
States could have protected its preferences is at least a realistic 
possibility. The United States was able to significantly influence 
the negotiations at Rome on issues such as complementarity and 
specified elements of crimes even though it ultimately failed to 
join consensus. The emphasis at Rome on restraint and rigorous 
definition ultimately proved to the Court’s advantage and prob-
ably sped the ratification of the Statute.
On the question of aggression, the other permanent members 
of the Security Council, as well as some other countries, have 
maintained some of the United States’ preferred positions, but 
have become increasingly isolated. Even allies from the Rome 
Conference such as Germany have substantially altered their 
position. Although U.S. participation would have been par-
tially self-interested — limiting the chance that U.S. operations 
would fall within the definition — it would also have served as 
a valuable check. Furthermore, the U.S. renunciation of its sig-
nature would not have prevented its participation. The ICC still 
considers the U.S. to be a signatory observer2 and in any case, 
the proceedings of the Special Working Group on the Crime 
of Aggression are open to all members of the United Nations.3 
Other non-parties, such as China, have remained involved. 
hiStoriCal BaCkgrounD
The criminalization of aggression in international law dates 
to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) established at 
Nuremburg following the Second World War, and to its counter-
part, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Crimes 
against peace — as aggressive war was charged at Nuremburg 
— were further developed in Allied Military Tribunals con-
ducted in Germany under Control Council Law 10.4 Since then, 
however, there has been no further jurisprudence, and aggres-
sion was excluded from the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
In establishing the IMT, crimes against peace were included 
largely out of fear that senior Nazi leaders might otherwise 
escape punishment. Modern doctrines of command responsibil-
ity and joint criminal enterprise had yet to be developed to reach 
such individuals. Ultimately, the Nuremburg Charter provided 
for individual responsibility for:
Crimes against peace. Namely, planning, preparation, initia-
tion, or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation 
of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or par-
ticipation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accom-
plishment of any of the foregoing.5
Significantly, this formulation included only wars of aggression, 
which the prosecution argued had already been made criminal 
by a variety of international instruments from the 1920s.
Because they were conducted against the backdrop of 
the unquestionable aggression of the Nazi Conquests, the 
Nuremberg jurisprudence provides only a few principles clearly. 
A declaration of war was not required, but actual use of force 
was. Although the IMT considered the occupation of Austria 
and Czechoslovakia to be “aggressive in character,” they were 
* Garth Schofield is a J.D. candidate at Yale Law School and a 
Master’s candidate in international law and conflict resolution at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
21
not considered to be instances of criminal aggressive war.6 The 
motives of Germany and Japan — noting the goals of forcibly 
acquiring territory and securing domination over other states — 
were relevant. Crimes against peace were leadership crimes and 
restricted to those at the policy-making level. Mere preparation 
for war, however, was insufficient, and knowledge that the war 
was aggressive was required.7
After the war, the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
were immediately recognized as part of international law by 
the General Assembly of the new United Nations.8 The General 
Assembly also began the process of developing a definition of 
aggression9 and directed the International Law Commission 
to develop a Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind. These two efforts occupied the majority 
of the discussion on aggression in subsequent decades, although 
the International Law Commission’s work never departed sig-
nificantly from the Nuremberg formula.10 
The General Assembly’s definition of aggression was finally 
adopted in 1974 and constitutes the most significant alternate 
touchstone to the Nuremberg precedents.11 It was not intended 
to provide a basis for individual criminal responsibility, but to 
provide guidance to the Security Council in determining state 
responsibility. Although adopted by consensus, the definition 
left unresolved significant differences relating to the intent 
behind aggressive uses of force and aggression in wars of libera-
tion. The superpowers and their allies wanted a high threshold 
and an intent standard to insulate their own military operations, 
while the developing states of the Nonaligned Movement sought 
to include any possible use of force against them within its scope. 
The definition hews very closely to the prohibition on the use of 
force in the UN Charter, while also providing an illustrative list 
of acts that would constitute aggression. No threshold of gravity 
or particular motive is required, implying that any use of force 
not authorized by the Charter would constitute aggression. 
reCent negotiationS anD iSSueS
Negotiations to define aggression for the ICC have taken 
place in three different fora — at the Rome Conference and its 
Preparatory Committee; in the Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression of the Preparatory Commission on the ICC between 
1999 and 2001; and since 2002 in the Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression established by the Assembly of States 
Parties. Consistent disagreements have surrounded the role of 
the Security Council in determining that a state act of aggres-
sion had occurred and the scope of the definition and threshold 
of gravity.
roMe ConFerenCe
At Rome in 1998, negotiations deadlocked over the role 
of the Security Council. The Permanent Five and a number of 
supporters insisted that the court should only be able to proceed 
in the wake of a Security Council determination that a state 
act of aggression had occurred. Opponents of this position felt 
that making the court dependent on a political decision by the 
Security Council would destroy its independence, although a 
majority favored a compromise if one could be reached. Part of 
the debate hinged not on whether a Security Council finding of 
aggression would be necessary for jurisdiction, but whether such 
a determination would be reviewable at trial. 
In debating aggression, the participants at Rome focused 
on a three-option draft paper prepared by the final Preparatory 
Committee in 1998.12 The first option essentially reproduced the 
definition from the Nuremberg Charter, even maintaining the 
language of Nuremberg, referring in square brackets to crimes 
against peace and wars of aggression. The second option was 
developed from a proposal by Egypt and Italy and adopted the 
list of aggressive acts from Article 3 of the General Assembly 
definition.13 Whether the list would be merely illustrative or 
would constitute an exhaustive list of aggressive acts remained 
under debate. The third option was developed from a German 
proposal14 and sought to update the Nuremberg definition while 
maintaining a high threshold for aggressive acts to become 
criminal. Dispensing with the words “war of aggression,” the 
German proposal used the term “armed attack” from Article 51 
of the UN Charter. 
Although no consensus definition was reached, the majority 
of states supported the German option. The developing states 
split, with only Middle Eastern states favoring the General 
Assembly-inspired second option. Support for the straight incor-
poration of the Nuremberg definition was minimal. Later in the 
“In negotiations, the parties continued to disagree  
about whether the crime of aggression should apply to 
any ‘act of aggression’ of sufficient gravity, or whether 
the term ‘armed attack’ should be used. Support for any 
continued use of the term ‘war of aggression,’  
however, was minimal, and the majority favored the 
broadest term of ‘act of aggression.’”
22
conference, the first and second options were dropped and states 
were asked to support or oppose including the German defini-
tion. A majority still favored including the definition if a com-
promise could be reached on the role of the Security Council. 
As the conference drew to a close, the Conference Bureau 
placed a deadline on the definition of aggression, proposing that 
it be excluded from the statute if a definition could not be agreed 
on by the end of the day on July 13. At the time, however, 
debate was focused on the question of whether jurisdiction over 
core crimes would be automatic or on an opt-in basis for each 
crime. Aggression was a less pressing issue and no agreement 
was reached.
preparatory CoMMiSSion For the  
international CriMinal Court
The task of defining aggression was passed to the Preparatory 
Commission by Resolution F of the Rome Conference15 and 
remained there until the Statute entered force in 2002. The 
General Assembly-based definition was immediately rein-
troduced for consideration by a coalition of Middle Eastern 
position was strongly supported by the United States, but did not 
achieve a consensus.21 A significant number of states continued 
to support either a General Assembly-based definition, or an 
alternate low-threshold definition.22
In 2001, the debate returned to the role of the Security 
Council. Various proposals were made to allow the Court to 
proceed if the Security Council failed to act in 12 months, to 
proceed on the basis of an advisory opinion from the ICJ,23 or 
simply to act without recourse to the Security Council.24 The 
United States and the other permanent members of the Security 
Council continued to strongly oppose these proposals. The U.S. 
position was that the Charter power to determine when an act of 
aggression had occurred was granted exclusively to the Security 
Council because it fell under Chapter VII, even if other bodies 
had a role in peace and security generally.25 
aSSeMBly oF StateS partieS
No definition was produced by the final session of the 
Preparatory Commission in July 2002, at which point the 
United States had already withdrawn from participation in the 
Court. The first act of the Assembly of States Parties was to 
establish a Special Working Group to continue the Preparatory 
Commission’s work on aggression.26 
The core debates of the previous efforts have continued, but 
with a significant shift in the tone of negotiations. The discus-
sions at the Assembly of States Parties have been based on 
the consolidated definition that incorporates much more of the 
General Assembly definition than previous consolidated texts.27 
Remaining elements of the German proposal were reduced to 
square brackets, the threshold of gravity for aggression was 
altered to limit jurisdiction to acts that constitute “flagrant” 
violations of the Charter, and an act of aggression was defined 
as “an act referred to in United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 3314 (XXIX).”28 The revised discussion paper, from 
January 2007, goes even further — whether the definition 
recommended to the Assembly will be based on the General 
Assembly definition is no longer under debate. 
In negotiations, the parties continued to disagree about 
whether the crime of aggression should apply to any “act of 
aggression” of sufficient gravity, or whether the term “armed 
attack” should be used. Support for any continued use of the 
term “war of aggression,” however, was minimal,29 and the 
majority favored the broadest term of “act of aggression.” 
Reference to the objectives of aggression — annexing or occu-
pying territory — was first modified to make it merely illustra-
tive and then effectively dropped in favor of referring to mani-
fest violations of the Charter. A number of delegations even 
opposed limiting the definition to manifest or flagrant breaches 
of the UN Charter.30 
By February 2007, even developed states, including France 
and China, which had previously opposed using the General 
Assembly definition, accepted it and were concerned only 
with whether all or part of the definition would be included. 
A general reference to the General Assembly resolution raises 
potential problems as the definition allows the Security Council 
to designate additional, unspecified acts as aggression. Many 
developing states wanted to limit the reference to Articles 1 and 
3 of the General Assembly definition, which would address the 
legality concern of allowing the definition to be expanded, but 
would also excise all references to the Security Council and the 
states,16 while Germany reintroduced its proposed definition 
in its original form.17 Russia brought back the Nuremberg 
definition.18 Although attempts were made to integrate General 
Assembly elements into the German formulation,19 the doctrinal 
split among states between those preferring a high threshold 
for aggression and those preferring an expansive definition 
remained, as did the split between those favoring general defini-
tion and those who preferred an illustrative list of acts.
Germany made a strong effort to defend a high threshold, 
emphasizing that even the General Assembly definition dis-
tinguishes between the crime of aggression and other acts of 
aggression. Germany’s argument was that past instances of 
unquestionable aggression share certain characteristics: “a 
particular magnitude and dimension;”20 serious consequences, 
such as loss of life and widespread destruction; and objectives 
unacceptable to the international community, such as annexa-
tion, annihilation, and the deportation of populations. A broader 
definition would draw the court into minor border conflicts and 
skirmishes where a clear aggressor is difficult to determine. This 
“The emphasis at Rome 
on restraint and rigor-
ous definition ultimately 
proved to the Court’s 
advantage and probably 
sped the ratification  
of the Statute.”
23
“While the threshold for aggression has been  
lowered, developing the rules of procedure and elements 
of crimes, which was a major U.S. interest at Rome,  
has not been seriously discussed.”
portion of the definition which distinguishes between the crime 
of aggression and other acts of aggression.31 
outStanDing iSSueS, trenDS, anD u.S. preFerenCeS
The trend in negotiations has been clearly away from the for-
mulation of aggression favored by the United States, particularly 
since the U.S. withdrawal from the Court. The United States 
strongly favored a guaranteed role for the Security Council. The 
United States also previously favored defining aggression in 
part on the basis of the purpose and objectives of the aggressor. 
During the negotiations in the 1970s on the General Assembly 
definition, the United States and other European powers argued 
that aggressive intent was closer to the customary law and the 
Nuremberg precedents, and a better indication of aggression 
than the first use of force. Such a focus would avoid introducing 
the question of criminality in minor incidents and would prevent 
the definition from applying to most U.S. operations that do not 
seek to annex territory or seize resources.
None of these objectives has been advanced by the course 
of negotiations to date. The draft definition supported by the 
Although the delegations debated whether the Court should 
proceed if the Security Council declines or is unable to make a 
determination, there has been no debate about the weight of a 
Security Council resolution that aggression has not occurred. It 
is not clear under any of the formulations whether such a resolu-
tion would permanently prevent the Court from charging aggres-
sion, or if the Court could only be prevented from proceeding 
through year-by-year resolutions invoking Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute. Other procedural options, such as requiring a full 
session of the Pre-Trial Chamber in order to proceed without the 
Security Council have not been thoroughly discussed.
ConCluSion
the assembly oF states parties may prove no more success-
ful than its predecessors in devising a definition of aggression 
capable of meeting the demanding standards for amending the 
statute.34 On the other hand, the role of the Security Council has 
been the major sticking point in all of the previous attempts. Yet 
in recent negotiations, less than ten state parties, including the 
United Kingdom, France, Russia, Australia, Poland and China, 
majority of states has progressively lowered the threshold for the 
crime of aggression from a war of aggression, to an armed attack 
aimed at capturing territory, to any act of aggression in manifest 
violation of the Charter. Any reference to particular aggressive 
intentions has been all but removed, and the General Assembly 
definition has been progressively incorporated, while its distinc-
tion between criminal aggression and other aggressive acts has 
been ignored. In a definition based on the General Assembly 
formula — in particular a definition based only on Articles 1 and 
3 — the “manifest violation” requirement is the only provision 
distinguishing insignificant border conflicts or even legal uses of 
self-defense from acts of aggression.32 Because the purpose of 
an action may not be considered, uses of force of questionable 
legality but not motivated by aggressive intent — humanitar-
ian intervention or anticipatory self-defense — will likely fall 
under the proposed definition of aggression. This places great 
weight on how the words “manifest violation” are ultimately 
interpreted.
While the threshold for aggression has been lowered, devel-
oping the rules of procedure and elements of crimes, which was 
a major U.S. interest at Rome, has not been seriously discussed. 
The last draft of the elements of the crime of aggression was 
prepared in 2002 and has not been modified since.33 These drafts 
elements require no particular mens rea requirement and there 
has been no discussion of potential procedural and evidentiary 
issues.
remain insistent on a mandatory Security Council determination. 
While the Assembly might be loathe to adopt a definition over 
the votes of the permanent members, this may not be enough to 
block adoption of an amendment, or even its ratification. There 
appears to be a strong desire in the Assembly to produce a defi-
nition for adoption in 2009 or 2010. The ratification and entry 
into force of the Rome Statute happened much more quickly 
than many originally predicted. It is entirely conceivable that 
the adoption and ratification of an amendment — even over the 
opposition of the Permanent Five — may also proceed more 
quickly than might be expected.
Should such a definition be adopted, a lower threshold for 
aggression could present problems for the Court. The virtue of 
a high-threshold definition is not that it reflects the international 
consensus on the limits of the crime of aggression. From the 
fact that many states have consistently advocated lower limits, 
many states clearly believe that the crime of aggression extends 
further. Rather, the virtue of a high-threshold definition is 
that it would involve the Court in only those cases on which a 
near consensus exists as to their criminality. A high-threshold 
definition would keep the Court from being drawn into conflicts 
where a clear aggressor cannot readily be identified and discour-
age states from attempting to use aggression charges as leverage 
in relatively low-level conflicts. It would also minimize the 
chance of a disagreement between the Court and the Security 
Council regarding whether a particular case constituted aggres-
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